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FAILURE TO WEAR SEAT BELTS
AS CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE:
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WISCONSIN RULE
THE GENERAL STATUS OF THE LAW
The increase of automobile traffic and the attendant increase in the
number of motor vehicle accidents over the past several years has
caused great concern among the members of both state and federal
legislatures. Federal interest in highway improvement as well as the
recently established Federal Safety Standards, illustrate the interest of
Congress in doing all that is possible to insure the safety of the motor-
ing public. State legislatures have taken similar steps to provide the
safest possible roads and vehicles. Among these state measures have
been the introduction of statutes requiring the installation of seat belts
in all new cars sold to state residents. Presently 31 states have such
laws.'
Wisconsin pioneered in this legislation and placed the statutory
mandate on all automobiles beginning with 1962 models. 2 This statute
also prohibits removal of the belts once installed in a vehicle. Chapter
3473 also makes it unlawful to sell such inadequately equipped vehicles
1 CAL. VEHICLE CODE §27309 (Supp. 1966); CONN. GEN. STATS. ANN. §14-100a
(Supp. 1966) ; GA. CODE ANN. tit. 68 §1801 (Supp. 1966) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
95V2 §217.1 (Supp. 1966) ; IND STAT. ANN. tit. 47 §2241 (1966) ; IOWA CODE
ANN. §321.445 (1966); KAN. STAT. ANN. ch. 8 §§8-5, 135 (Supp. 1965);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29 §1368-A (Supp. 1966) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 66y2
§296A (1967); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 90 §7 (Supp. 1966); MICH. STAT.
ANN. tit. 9 §9.2410(2) (Supp. 1965) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. ch. 169 §169.685(Supp. 1966) ; MISS. CODE ANN. tit. 30 §8254.5 (Supp. 1966); Mo. ANN. STAT.
ch. 304 §304.55 (Supp. 1966) ; MONT. REV. CODE ANN. tit. 32 §32-21-150.1 (Supp.
1965); NED. REV. STAT ch. 39 §39-7, 123.05 (Supp. 1965) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. tit.
39 §39:3-76.2 (Supp. 1966) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. ch. 64 §64-20-75 (Supp. 1965) ;
N.Y. VEHICLE & TRAFFIC LAW §383 (a) (g) (Supp. 1966) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. ch.
20 §20-135.2 (Supp. 1965) ; N.D. CODE ANN. ch. 39-21 §39-21-41.1 (Supp. 1965) ;
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. tit. 45 §4513.26.2 (Supp. 1966) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
47 §47-12-413 (Supp. 1966) ; ORE. REV. STAT. tit. 39 §483.482 (Supp. 1965) ; R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. §31-23-39 (Supp. 1966); TENN. CODE ANN. tit. 59 §59-930
(Supp. 1966); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 §4(29) (Supp. 1965); VA. CODE tit. 46
§46.1-309.1 (Supp. 1966) ; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. tit. 46 §46.37.510 (Supp.
1966) ; W. VA CODE ANN. ch. 17C art. 15 §43 (Supp. 1966) ; Wis. STAT. §347.48
(1965).
2 Wis. Laws ch. 521 (1961). This statute was amended in 1963 by ch. 448 and
presently appears as Wis. STAT. §347A8 (1965) : Safety belts. (1) SAFETY
BELTS REQUIRED. It is unlawful for any person to buy, sell, lease, trade or
transfer from or to Wisconsin residents at retail an automobile, which is
manufactured or assembled commencing with the 1962 models, unless such
vehicle is equipped with safety belts installed for use in the left front and
right front seats thereof, and no such vehicle shall be operated in this state
unless such belts remain installed.
(2) TYPE AND MANNER OF INSTALLING. All such safety belts must be of a
type and must be installed in a manner approved by the motor vehicle depart-
ment. The department shall establish specifications and requirements for ap-
proved types of safety belts and attachments thereto. The department will
accept, as approved, all seat belt installations and the belt anchor meeting the
society of automotive engineers' specifications.
3 WIS. STAT. §347.03 (1965).
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and places additional responsibility for statutory violation upon the
owner for knowingly causing or permitting the operation of an im-
properly equipped vehicle on a highway.4 Many other states have since
followed suit in passing seat belt statutes, although none of these states,
except perhaps that of Illinois,5 makes the use of these devices manda-
tory.
Even though none of these statutes compels use, it is obvious that
the intent behind the passage of these statutes was to provide a safer
vehicle for sale to the public. Widely publicized studies of auto acci-
dents have shown that the presence of some sort of restraining device
would have made a crucial difference in the severity of injuries sus-
tained in many automobile collisions.6 It would seem, therefore, that
state legislatures enacted seat belt laws so as to place at the disposal of
their resident motorists a means of reducing traffic fatalities and serious
injuries. In most states apparently no thought was given to imposing a
sanction upon motorists who did not wear available belts. It seems
equally apparent that little thought was given to the possible effect of a
motorist's failure to wear seat belts on his civil recovery for personal
injuries. 7
However, the advent of these statutes has given rise to an interesting
series of personal injury cases in which the plaintiff's failure to use
seat belts has been raised, with varying degrees of success, as an affirm-
ative defense. A review of a few of these cases illustrates that certain
legal problems are presented when such a defense is used. In the South
Carolina case of Sams v. Samss the defendant alleged the plaintiff's
failure to wear seat belts as an affirmative defense. The trial court
order granting the plaintiff's motion to strike this defense was over-
ruled by the supreme court. While the court took no position on the
merits of the defense it held that the defendant should be allowed to
plead and prove it if he could. In the Florida case of Brown v. Kend-
rick9 such an affirmative defense was stricken by the trial court and
affirmed by the appellate court. There was no Florida law requiring
installation or use of these devices, and the court ruled that the defend-
ant had not shown, except by conjecture, that the use of seat belts would
have prevented the injury complained of. The court's concern with a
defense based on conjecture is odd in light of the fact that striking the
4 WIs. STAT. §347.04 (1965).
5 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95%, §217.1 (1963).
s Huelke, Grabb, Dingman, Facial Injuries in Automotive Accidents, American
Association for Automotive Medicine (Oct. 1964) ; Huelke, Auto Accidents
and the Dentist, 20 J. of Oral Surgery, Anesthesia and Hospital Dental Ser-
vice Authorities 332 (July 1962) ; Huelke, Gikas, Determination of Seat Belt
Effectiveness for Survival in Fatal Highway Collisions, 7th Stapp Car Crash
Conference (1965).
7 IOWA CODE ANN. §321.445 (1966).
8 148 S.E. 2d 154 (S.C. 1966).
9 192 So. 2d 49 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
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defense precluded the defendant from introducing evidence to establish
that the injury would have been prevented if the belts were used.
A Texas district court that dealt with a similar set of facts sustained
a jury finding that 95% of the plaintiff's injuries would have been
avoided had he worn his seat belt." Expert testimony was presented
during the trial to establish the causal connection between the injuries
sustained and the failure to wear seat belts.
THE SEAT BELT DEFENSE IN THE WISCONSIN TRIAL COURTS
Wisconsin trial courts have recently dealt with several cases in
which the defense of failure to use seat belts was interposed. In a She-
boygan circuit court case the court read Section 347.48 to the jury and
recognized in its instructions to them that:
Since the statute which I have just quoted requires that, com-
mencing with the 1962 models, all automobiles bought, sold,
leased, traded, or transferred from or to Wisconsin residents at
retail be equipped with safety belts installed for use in the left
front and right front seats thereof; it must be clear that the
statute contemplates the use of such belts when the car is equipped
with them by the driver in the left front seat and the passenger
in the right front seat whenever such driver or passenger or both,
have the duty to exercise ordinary care for their own safety."
The court then went on to instruct on the duty of ordinary care
and the special verdict asked whether the plaintiff's failure to wear
seat belts, on the facts presented, was a breach of that duty. The jury
found that the plaintiff was 10% negligent. Under Wisconsin's com-
parative negligence statute the plaintiff's award was then reduced by
10%.
In Milwaukee County, a request for the admission into evidence of
the failure to use seat belts was permitted in the case of Busick v. Bud-
ter.12 The court instructed the jury on the statute and then stated:
The law does not require operators of automobiles to use
safety belts. However, in passing on the question as to whether
or not the plaintiff, Kathleen Busick was negligent for failing to
use the safety belt you may take into consideration the fact that
the automobile was equipped with safety belts and that a safety
belt was available for use by her.
Failure to use available seat belts as a defense in an auto personal
injury case has gained further recognition from Wisconsin's trial court
judges. In December of 1966 the Wisconsin Board of Circuit Court
Judges adopted the following model jury instruction:
10 Vernon v. Droeste, Dist. Ct., Brazos County, Texas, No. 17205 (Jan. 9, 1966).
11 Stockinger v. Dunisch, Cir. Ct. ,Sheboygan County, Wis., (1964).
12 Busick v. Budner, Cir. Ct., Milwaukee County, Wis., No. 381-602 (Dec. 1965).
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No. 1277 SAFETY BELT. FAILURE TO USE
In passing on the question as to whether or not ............
.................... was negligent, you may take into consid-
eration the facts that the automobile was equipped with safety
belts and that they were available for use by him.
You will determine, under all the credible evidence and rea-
sonable inferences from the evidence in this case, whether the
failure of ........................ to use the safety belt was
an omission to take a precaution for his safety, and amounted,
under the circumstances, to a failure on his part to exercise
ordinary care for his own safety.13
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE JURISDICTION
In jurisdictions in which contributory negligence is a complete bar
to recovery, as opposed to a comparative negligence statute such as
Wisconsin's, a seat belt defense may have some inherent difficulty.
There may be some reluctance to completely bar recovery to a person
whose failure to wear available seat belts contributed to his injuries.
This may be thought of as a rather harsh result, 14 especially since a
plaintiff's failure to buckle up could not be held to be a cause of the
accident. Nevertheless, Dean Prosser notes that the defense of contribu-
tory negligence is generally allowed when the plaintiff's negligence "has
been a substantial factor in causing his injury." 15
It would seem that there is another doctrine, much like contributory
negligence, which might be available in such a case. It would merely
reduce the plaintiff's damages rather than bar recovery. This is the
doctrine of avoidable consequences. Prosser notes that the concepts of
contributory negligence and avoidable consequences are alike in all
respects, except for the fact that the former is generally thought to take
place befrae there has been any damage to, or invasion of plaintiff's
rights, while "the rule of avoidable consequences comes into play after
a legal wrong has occurred, but while some damages may still be
averted, and bars recovery only for such damages."' 6 He notes that this
distinction often becomes rather tenuous and that:
In a limited number of situations, the plaintiff's unreasonable
conduct, although it is prior or contemporaneous, may be found
to have caused only a separable part of the damage. In such a
case, even though it is called contributory negligence, the appor-
tionment will be made."
Prosser further recognizes that "a more difficult problem is pre-
sented when the plaintiff's prior conduct is found to have played no
13 Wis. jury Instructions-Civil, No. 1277 (1966).
L4 PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 428 (3d ed. 1964); Comment, 12 S.D. L. Rev. 130, 134
(1967).
'15 PROSSER, LAW OF ToRTs 431 (3d ed. 1964).
26 Id. at 433 (emphasis added).
17 Ibid.
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part in bringing about an impact or accident, but to have aggravated
the ensuing damages." 18 The choice here seems to be either to grant or
deny an apportionment. Prosser clearly states that he favors the bal-
ancing of fault and an apportionment between the parties, at least when
"the extent of aggravation can be determined with any reasonable degree
of certainty. . .."19
It has been further urged in prior articles that another apportion-
ment might be necessary in a seat belt case. This is the apportionment
between the injuries to the plaintiff for his non-use of the seat belt
which would reduce the amount of damages which a negligent defend-
ant would have to pay for personal injuries, and as an entirely separate
item, the amount due plaintiff for damage to his vehicle.2 0 It would seem
that where the plaintiff has not been responsible for this item and he
can prove a fixed amount of damage there would be no problem. That
is to say, the automobile damage could be handled as an element of spe-
cial tort damage and remain in a separate category apart from the seat
belt issue. In the practical handling of such a problem it would seem to
be likely that the amount due for auto damage might be stipulated.
THE NEED FOR EXPERT TESTIMONY
Thus it appears that it is at least possible in a contributory negligence
jurisdiction to argue for this more equitable balancing of the fault
which caused plaintiff's injuries. Of course expert testimony would be
needed in order to establish both the fact that non-use was causal and
the degree to which it was a cause of the enumerated injuries.2 ' Such
testimony would probably have to go beyond the scope of medical testi-
mony concerning the nature of the injuries. The testimony of an expert
in the study and reconstruction of traffic accidents would be needed in
order to establish that certain injuries were directly attributable to mo-
tion and impact which seat belts would have restrained.
WISCONSIN HAS DEVELOPED A FLEXIBLE RULE
There is another argument for an apportionment of damages which
would seem to be peculiarly adaptable to the existing scheme of Wiscon-
sin statutes. It could be argued that the Wisconsin seat belt statute es-
tablished a minimum standard of care for motorists who have belts
available for use, even though use is not made mandatory by the law.
Clearly the legislature did not require the installation of seat belts
for the sake of esthetic beauty. It seems obvious that the legislature,
faced with an annually increasing highway accident and death toll, con-
's Ibid.
19 Id. at 434.20 Comment, 12 S.D. L. Rev. 130, 134 (1967).




sidered that the installation and use of seat belts would help to reduce
this rate. By analogy, the purpose of the seat belt act might be compared
to the interpretation of the Wisconsin licensing code set out in McCon-
,ille v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.:
The state licenses motor vehicle operators in the public in-
terest. An applicant must satisfy an examiner of his ability to
read and understand highway signs, his knowledge of traffic laws,
and demonstrate his ability to exercise ordinary and reasonable
control of a motor vehicle. These requirements evince a legisla-
tive policy to impose the same minimum standards of operation
of automobiles upon all drivers.
22
Prosser bolsters this argument when he states:
The standard of conduct required of a reasonable man may be
prescribed by legislative enactment. When a statute provides that
under certain circumstances particular acts shall or shall not be
done, it may be interpreted as fixing a standard for all members
of the community from which it is negligence to deviate.23
Thus if a person can be pentlized for removing these seat belts once
installed in a vehicle, it would appear that he should not recover for
personal injuries which could have been prevented or made less severe
by their use.
There may have been many reasons why the legislature did not com-
pel the use of seat belts. It may have been concerned with setting up a
double standard for pre and post 1962 autos. However, the legislature
must have been impressed, as was the Wisconsin Supreme Court, with
facts similar to those presented in a 1964 article which stated:
The use of seat belts lowered the 1964 accident toll by about
750 deaths. Only 30% of passenger cars have seat belts installed
and these are used 50% of the time. Full installation and use of
seat belts could reduce deaths by 5,000 annually and serious in-
juries by one third. It has been shown that many of these deaths
are caused by persons in the car striking portions of the car or
being thrown out of the car by serious impact.24
Under these circumstances and given a statute which itself imposes
no sanctions for the failure to use seat belts, it would seem that the
court had to speak to clear up this ambiguity.2 5
This is not to say that a finding of negligence per se is proper in a
case where seat belts were not worn and injuries ensued. Such a position
would be unreasonable in light of studies which have shown that in
some automobile accidents the use of seat belts would have had no effect
22 15 Wis. 2d 374, 383, 113 N.W. 2d 14, 19 (1962).
23 PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 191 (3d ed. 1964).
24 Stop Murder by Motor, America Trial Lawyers Association monograph, Jan.,
1966.
25 Farmers Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Gast, 17 Wis. 2d 344, 348, 117 N.W. 2d 347, 350
(1962).
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on diminishing the injuries. 26 There may also be circumstances in which
because of a recent medical operation, pregnancy or the like, the use of
seat belts might be dangerous. The Wisconsin Supreme Court in the
case of Bentzler v. Braun27 construed the Wisconsin seat belt statute to
concur with this view when it stated that:
It seems apparent that the Wisconsin legislation, which does
not require by its terms the use of seat belts, cannot be considered
a safety statute in a sense that it is negligence per se for an occu-
pant of an automobile to fail to use available seat belts.2
However, studies reveal that in the majority of auto accidents seat
belts would have a significant effect in reducing injuries and death. 29
This being the situation, it would seem that a rule which would permit
the admission of the fact of non-use into evidence would be in order.
Of course, there would have to be evidence which would establish
whether the injuries complained of could have been prevented or re-
duced by seat belt use. Balanced against the plaintiff's rebutting evidence
presented in similar fashion, a more accurate picture of the relative
faults of the two parties could then be presented. It would then be for
the jury to decide whether the non-use did in fact contribute to the
plaintiff's injuries.
In Wisconsin the next step would then be to apportion the negli-
gence of the parties under the comparative negligence statute.30 This is
precisely the procedure which the courts in Wisconsin which have tried
such cases have allowed.
THE WISCONSIN SOLUTION
In the recent case of Bentzler v. Braun"1 the Wisconsin court may
have found a partial solution to the dilemma of the seat belt defense.
There the plaintiff, while riding in a car equipped with seat belts, which
she was not wearing, was injured in a rear end collision. She suffered
severe facial injuries, the loss of teeth, a severe compound fracture of
the right thigh and knee and a fracture of the lower left leg. Defense
counsel requested the following instructions:
"The Klimmer automobile which the plaintiff, Janet Bentzler,
was a passenger in, was equipped with a safety belt in the right
front seat in which Janet Bentzler was riding at the time of the
accident. If you find that the seat belt was in working order and
that Janet Bentzler was not wearing the seat belt at the time of
the accident, then you must find her negligent.
26 Medical Tribune, Sept. 16, 1964.
27 34 Wis. 2d 362, 149 N.W. 2d 626 (1967).
28 Id. at 385, 149 N.W.2cf at 639.
29 Id. at 386, 149 N.W.2d at 639.
30 Wis. STAT. §895.045 (1965).
- 34 Wis. 2d 362, 149 N.W. 2d 626 (1967).
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, If you find the plaintiff, Janet Bentzler, negligent with regard
to use of a safety belt you are then to determine if the use of a
safety belt would have eliminated or reduced the injuries sus-
tained. If you find that the injuries sustained would have been
eliminated or reduced by use of a safety belt, then a failure to use
a safety belt is a cause of the injuries and damages sustained." 32
This request as well as a request for a special verdict covering plain-
tiff's negligence for non-use was denied by the trial court. On the gen-
eral question of plaintiff's negligence the jury found that she had been
negligent but that her negligence was not the cause of her injuries. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the trial court's action because appar-
ently there was insufficient proof presented to show a causal relationship
between plaintiff's failure to wear her belt and the injuries she sustained.
However, the court at the same time cited the 'rule of Theisen v. Mil-
waukee Auto. Mut. Ins. Co.:
The test of the guest's negligence is whether under the cir-
cumstances he acted with the care a reasonably prudent man
would have used under the circumstances. His negligence so de-
termined is based on his duty to use ordinary care as a guest under
the circumstances for his own safety.33
With this the court then established the rule of reason which it de-
sired to have followed in future seat belt defense cases. It stated:
The question, therefore, is not whether the guest's negligence
contributed to the cause of the accident but, rather, whether it
contributed to the injuries. In view of the Wisconsin statutes
that the legislative mandate in regard to seat belts applies merely
to installation and not to use, the failure to use available seat belts
is a question for determination by the jury as in the case of any
ordinary negligence, i.e., was the conduct a substantial factor in
producing a result.
We therefore conclude that, in those cases where seat belts are
available and there is evidence before the jury indicating causal
relationship between the injuries sustained and the failure to use
seat belts, it is proper and necessary to instruct the jury in that
regard. A jury in such case could conclude that an occupant of an
automobile is negligent in failing to use seat belts.3 4
CONCLUSION
It is submitted that this is a reasonable rule which permits the plain-
tiff to introduce mitigating evidence to explain the non-use of seat belts
for medical reasons or other extenuating circumstances. However, if
there is to be a rule which properly places the fault upon he who was
the cause of the harm, this evidence must be admitted. In Wisconsin,
the comparative negligence statute further permits a balancing of the
3.2' Id. at 383, 149 N.W.2d at 638.
33 18 Wis. 2d 91, 106, 118 N.W. 2d 140 (1962).
3434 Wis. 2d 362, 387, 149 N.W. 2d 626, 640 (1967).
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interests of the parties so that fault may be properly placed. The final
problem arises in the situation in which an injured party, by his failure
to wear his seat belt, is proved to have been responsible for fifty per cent
or more of his own injuries. In such a case, under Wisconsin law, he
would receive no recovery. Perhaps the fairer solution in such a case,
since the plaintiff's negligence was passive and not a cause of the acci-
dent but only of his own harm, would be an application of the doctrine
of avoidable consequences.
Such a solution may be necessary in a situation involving a multiple
car accident. Juries may have considerable difficulty in such a case with
an apportionment of negligence. Not only would the driver's active
negligence have to be compared as it relates to the cause of the accident
but passive negligence of non-seat belt wearing claimants would also
have to come into consideration. The difficulties of such a comparison
might lead Wisconsin to adopt an avoidable consequence approach in
seat belt cases.
It is submitted that such a method would work the greatest justice
to all the litigants in such an action. The relative fault of all parties
would be apportioned to a greater degree than ever before. Furthermore,
by so acting the Wisconsin courts would be able to both encourage the
use of seat belts and at the same time prevent the harsh results of a
strict application of the law of comparative negligence to an untried
area.
MICHAEL B. RICK
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